Verify it yourself

Don't trust us. Check the hardware.#

Every claim on this site reduces to one checkable fact: the room is running the exact code we say it is, inside genuine confidential hardware. You can confirm that without taking our word for anything.

What attestation proves#

When you open a room, the enclave produces a quote — a small blob signed by the CPU's hardware root of trust. The quote contains the MRTD fingerprint measured at boot. Verifying it proves three things at once:

1. 01The hardware is genuine confidential-computing silicon, not an emulator.
2. 02The code loaded into the enclave matches the expected fingerprint — the model wasn't swapped and no logger was injected.
3. 03The session key you're encrypting to belongs to *that* enclave, so nobody can sit in the middle.

The expected fingerprint#

<the room's published MRTD>

How to check#

1. 01Open a room and expand the proof chip on any reply to see the live quote and fingerprint.
2. 02Confirm the fingerprint matches the value above. The client does this automatically and refuses to continue if it doesn't.
3. 03Validate the quote's signature chain back to the hardware vendor's root certificate.

A full, scriptable walkthrough lives in the blog: How to verify a Darkroom attestation and How TEE attestation works.

Coming: the open protocol#

The verifier and the enclave worker are being prepared as an open repository so you can run the full check — and the room itself — yourself. This page will link it when it lands.